Files
the-daily-epub/src/auth.rs
T
thalladaandClaude Fable 5.1 3a9f4b99e0 Curation v2 step 1: three-way feedback, rating events, reader profile
- Migration 0002: rating_events, article_embeddings, interest_embeddings,
  article_assessments, candidate_runs, runs.config_json/provider_costs_json,
  issue_articles.why; copies ratings into rating_events and drops ratings and
  feed_priors (scores stays until step 4).
- Vote is Loved | Good | NotForMe; legacy `up` links still verify as Loved.
- Footer offers Loved it / Good / Not for me; the confirmation page offers the
  other two so a mis-tap can be corrected. handle_rating appends one event.
- db::current_ratings implements the latest-explicit-event rule with summaries
  and facets; `ratings list|set|clear` CLI appends source='cli' events.
- data/profile.md replaces the hard-coded reader prose; the system prompt is
  rebuilt every run in the §8.4 order with a recent-verdicts block.
- Weekly rebuild reads summaries, facets and notes; feed priors removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A1rCLQeKBgnBo3oTgHuTMe
2026-09-02 03:23:39 +00:00

162 lines
5.4 KiB
Rust

//! Rating-link signing — the single source of truth for the HMAC token (spec §3.9).
//!
//! The EPUB article footer ([`crate::epub::build`]) mints the links and the rating
//! endpoint ([`crate::server`]) verifies them, so the formula must be identical on
//! both sides. It lives here and nowhere else:
//!
//! ```text
//! message = "{issue_date}/{article_id}/{loved|good|down}"
//! token = hex(hmac_sha256(secret, message))[..16]
//! link = {public_url}/r/{issue_date}/{article_id}/{vote}?t={token}
//! ```
//!
//! Pinned test vector, asserted from three places (here, `epub::build`,
//! `tests/m7_server.rs`): `secret = "test-secret"`, date `2026-08-15`,
//! article `42`, `loved` (with legacy `up` verification).
use hmac::{Hmac, KeyInit, Mac};
use jiff::civil::Date;
use sha2::Sha256;
use crate::types::{ArticleId, Vote};
/// Characters of the hex HMAC kept in rating links (§3.9).
pub const TOKEN_LEN: usize = 16;
/// The exact signed string: `{issue_date}/{article_id}/{loved|good|down}` (§3.9).
pub fn rating_message(issue_date: Date, article_id: ArticleId, vote: Vote) -> String {
format!("{issue_date}/{article_id}/{}", vote.as_str())
}
/// `hex(hmac_sha256(secret, "{issue_date}/{article_id}/{vote}"))[..16]` (§3.9).
pub fn rating_token(secret: &str, issue_date: Date, article_id: ArticleId, vote: Vote) -> String {
rating_token_for_segment(secret, issue_date, article_id, vote.as_str())
}
fn rating_token_for_segment(
secret: &str,
issue_date: Date,
article_id: ArticleId,
segment: &str,
) -> String {
// `Hmac` derives a fixed-size key from any input length, so this never fails.
let mut mac = <Hmac<Sha256> as KeyInit>::new_from_slice(secret.as_bytes())
.expect("HMAC accepts keys of any length");
mac.update(format!("{issue_date}/{article_id}/{segment}").as_bytes());
let digest = hex::encode(mac.finalize().into_bytes());
digest[..TOKEN_LEN].to_string()
}
/// Constant-time comparison of a supplied token against the expected one (§3.9).
pub fn verify_token(
secret: &str,
issue_date: Date,
article_id: ArticleId,
vote: Vote,
token: &str,
) -> bool {
let current = rating_token(secret, issue_date, article_id, vote);
if constant_time_eq(current.as_bytes(), token.as_bytes()) {
return true;
}
// Already-published `up` links were signed over the literal legacy segment.
vote == Vote::Loved
&& constant_time_eq(
rating_token_for_segment(secret, issue_date, article_id, "up").as_bytes(),
token.as_bytes(),
)
}
/// Length-independent, data-independent byte comparison.
///
/// A tiny local implementation so the crate does not need `subtle` directly;
/// `black_box` keeps the optimizer from short-circuiting the accumulate.
pub fn constant_time_eq(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
let mut diff = (a.len() ^ b.len()) as u8;
for i in 0..a.len().max(b.len()) {
let x = a.get(i).copied().unwrap_or(0);
let y = b.get(i).copied().unwrap_or(0);
diff |= x ^ y;
}
std::hint::black_box(diff) == 0
}
/// Full rating URL embedded in an article footer:
/// `{public_url}/r/{date}/{article_id}/{loved|good|down}?t={token}` (§3.9).
pub fn rating_url(
public_url: &str,
secret: &str,
issue_date: Date,
article_id: ArticleId,
vote: Vote,
) -> String {
let token = rating_token(secret, issue_date, article_id, vote);
format!(
"{}/r/{issue_date}/{article_id}/{}?t={token}",
public_url.trim_end_matches('/'),
vote.as_str()
)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn date() -> Date {
"2026-08-15".parse().expect("date")
}
#[test]
fn all_three_tokens_verify_and_are_distinct() {
let votes = [Vote::Loved, Vote::Good, Vote::NotForMe];
let tokens: Vec<String> = votes
.iter()
.map(|vote| rating_token("test-secret", date(), 42, *vote))
.collect();
assert_eq!(tokens.len(), 3);
assert!(tokens.iter().all(|token| token.len() == TOKEN_LEN));
assert_ne!(tokens[0], tokens[1]);
assert_ne!(tokens[1], tokens[2]);
for (vote, token) in votes.into_iter().zip(tokens) {
assert!(verify_token("test-secret", date(), 42, vote, &token));
}
}
#[test]
fn legacy_up_token_still_verifies_as_loved() {
let legacy = rating_token_for_segment("test-secret", date(), 42, "up");
assert_eq!(legacy, "3b314cf7e6d8f50f");
assert!(verify_token(
"test-secret",
date(),
42,
Vote::Loved,
&legacy
));
}
#[test]
fn verification_rejects_tampering() {
let token = rating_token("s", date(), 42, Vote::Loved);
assert!(!verify_token("s", date(), 42, Vote::Good, &token));
assert!(!verify_token("s", date(), 43, Vote::Loved, &token));
assert!(!verify_token("other", date(), 42, Vote::Loved, &token));
assert!(!verify_token("s", date(), 42, Vote::Loved, "short"));
}
#[test]
fn url_shape_matches_the_spec() {
let token = rating_token("test-secret", date(), 42, Vote::Good);
assert_eq!(
rating_url(
"https://daily.hallada.net/",
"test-secret",
date(),
42,
Vote::Good
),
format!("https://daily.hallada.net/r/2026-08-15/42/good?t={token}")
);
}
}